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ABSTRACT 
Despite the continued and perhaps even increased productivity 
of quantitative social scientific historians (QUASSU, for short) and 
certain evidences of their acceptance by the historical profession, a 
reaction against QUASSH, first bruited shortly after the initial 
quantitative work was published, also continues, Calls for a return to 
the narrative tradition or suggestions that historians are returning to 
it, recently made by such leaders of the profession as Lawrence Stone 
and Bernard Bailyn, have begun to percolate down to the popular media. 
Rather than dismiss the criticisms of QUASSU out of hand, I 
attempt in this paper to categorize and answer them. Finding the 
objections misconceived, illogical, incomplete, or overstated, I 
examine also a proposal by Theodore Rabb to substitute a criterion of 
general quality for a consensus on methods. I find it difficult to 
believe that groups who begin from such different premises as QUASSH 
and some, but of course not all non-QUASSH historians, will agree on a 
"quality" criterion. Thus, it is unlikely that the schism will be 
quickly healed or that a respectful latitudinarianism will soon 
develop. 
"THE REVIVALISM OF NARRATIVE:, A RESPONSE TO RECENT CRITICISMS OF 
QUANTITATIVE HISTORY 
*This paper was delivered at the First International Conference on
Quantitative History, Washington, D.C., March 1982, and at the
California State University, Fullerton. 
In his presidential address to the Social Science History 
Association Convention in November, 1981, Robert William Fogel declared 
sanguinely that social scientific historians had won their battle for 
legitimacy within the historical profession in America, and that we 
should now stop feeling embattled, spend less effort proselytizing, and 
calmly go on with our substantive work. While his statistics on the 
occupational advancement of social scientific historians do indicate a 
degree of acceptance, and while his advice to worry less and pay 
attention to business will be followed (since that's what nearly all of 
us were doing anyway), I am less optimistic than Fogel, read the 
employment trends differently, and see more signs of a reaction against 
quantitative social scientific history, or what I like to refer to as 
QUASSH, than he does. (Kousser, 1980). Perhaps Professor Fogel and I 
differ only temperamentally, As a former Marxist, he still retains a 
bit of a faith in the inevitable triumph of progressive forces; while 
as a former Methodist, I am unable to shake off the pessimism which 
is the psychological residue of the doctrine of original sin. In any 
case, whereas Fogel seems to think most recent criticisms of QUASSH so 
obviously flawed as to require no answer, I fear that some people, 
especially those with substantial investments in history-as-it-used-to-
done, may still be susceptible to false messiahs, or perhaps more 
precisely, false Jeremiahs. 
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Unlike other fields, history has always been considered a 
popular subject, one accessible to any intelligent reader. Philosophy, 
astronomy, mathematics, and physics have always been arcane, Younger 
disciplines such as economics became mysterious only under considerable 
protest, and many of its high priests still double as part-time pop 
gurus, Yet despite the usually dismal sales figures of anything but 
military history and biographies of the powerful or picturesque, 
despite the turgid, pedestrian prose and topical narrowness of the 
typical monograph, despite the fact that nearly all current "serious 
history" can be understood only against the background of other works 
in its field, historians still aspire to general recognition, are quick 
to damn "jargon," continue to dream of being Michelets, Trevelyans, or 
Bancrofts, and condemn works they cannot immediately comprehend as 
"elitist." (See Tilly, 1981, 20,) At table in the Big House, Fogel 
may have missed the rumblings of day-to-day resistance in the slave 
cabins. 
The academic depression in history in this country and in 
others affected by the baby bust, stagflation, and the reaction against 
public spending, has, furthermore, dried up the pool of history 
graduate students, and seems especially to have frightened off those 
with that combination of mathematical and literary talents so necessary 
for the practitioners of QUASSH. The remaining puddle appears to 
abound with people who are either uninterested in moving or unable to 
move simultaneously in both the humanistic and social scientific 
cultures, Thus the potential anti-cliometric audience spans the 
generations. 
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Yet if the congregation is large, and in a mood to be 
revivalized, what of the content of the sermons? (Tilly, 1981, 37, may 
be blamed for this metaphor.) What alleged sins do the anti-numerical 
evangelists criticize QUASSH for and how valid is their castigation? 
In this counter-revivalist paper, I shall attempt to categorize and 
answer the most common complaints recently made about QUASSH, thereby 
pointing the way, if not toward salvation, at least away from purgatory 
or worse. 
Let us begin with The Fashion Design Analogy. One of the most 
trivial beefs is that QUASSH is either a passing or an already passed 
fad, (Barzun, 1974, 3; Scheiber, 1981, 349; Stone, 1977, 14.) 
Symbolic anthropology, with its carnivals, magic, and charivaris, is, 
we are told, now the modish social science, Supply and demand curves 
and regression coefficients, like the gowns Nancy Reagan wore last 
month, are fit only for museums. This well-worn but threadbare 
metaphor dressed up as an argument really needs no rebuttal. While it 
is often instructive to note what smart people are doing, bargain­
basement copies of Edward P, Thompson, Natalie Z, Davis, or Emmanuel Le Roi 
Ladurie are not necessarily good buys. If historians had always 
mimiced the style leaders, neither QUASSH nor anthropological history 
would ever have been cut out and stitched together. Surely the prime 
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practical requisites for intellectual clothes are fit, warmth, and 
durability, not the dictates of the haute couturies of Paris or Princeton. 
The Failure of Nerve and the Retreat Toward Solipsism. Some 
critics have become so pessimistic, or so convinced that others are, 
that they discern, in Lawrence Stone's words, the "end of an attempt to 
produce a coherent scientific explanation of change in the past ," 
(Stone, 1979, 19, Similarly, see Rabb, 1981, 323; Tilly, 1981, 62. ) 
Barzun goes further. The "first principle" of the "spirit of history," 
he tells us, is that "Man has no nature. , , • It is enough that in 
searching for what has happened by the agency of men everything and its 
opposite have equal likelihood and 'reason,'" ( Barzun, 1974, 152,) 
In a similarly depressing vein, Hayden White has concluded, on the 
basis of an examination of professional historians of the nineteenth 
century and non-professionals of the twentieth, that history is 
"protoscientific. "  "The physical sciences," White argues, "appear to 
progress by virtue of the agreements , reached from time to time among 
members of the established communities of scientists, regarding what 
will count as a scientific problem, the form that a scientific 
explanation must take, and the kinds of data that will be permitted to 
count as evidence in a properly sc.ientific account of reality. Among 
historians no such agreement exists, or has ever existed,"  Since 
consensus on such matters, for historians, if not for scientists, rests 
purely on "moral or aesthetic" grounds, and since historians are 
unlikely to agree on what is right and beautiful, "historiography has 
remained prey to the creation of mutually exclusive, though 
equally legitimate, interpretations of the same set of historical 
events or the same Se!;ment of the historical process." (Khite, 1973, 
12-13, 428. Italics mine.) But Barzun's dogmatic assertion undoes 
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more than what he sneeringly dubs "quanto-history,11 Stone's tends in 
the same direction, and White's reduces history to a brand of literary 
criticism in which it is apparently not possible to specify grounds for 
preferring one interpretation to another. If systematic knowledge of 
the past or present of human beings is unobtainable, why study any kind 
of history?1 
The Back to Macaulay Suggestion. Bernard Bailyn has recently 
called for historians to produce "synthetic works, narrative in 
structure," to rise above the merely local and the monographic 
"research reports� '�he great challenge of modern historical 
scholarship" is, he asserts, to produce "essential narratives" for a 
lay audience. (Bailyn, 1982, 7,) Others echo what Bailyn admits is 
his value-lacien judgment about the "goal of history" (Barzun, 1974, 93; 
Supple, 1981, 205) or adopt a more critical stance, but believe the 
scholarly trend is already taking the narrative direction Bailyn favors 
(Stone, 1979),2 
Yet there seem to be no .!!. priori reasons why histories should 
take the form of narratives, rather than analyses, or why historians 
should be more concerned to make their findings available to the public 
than, say, physicists or sociologists, and neither Bailyn nor others 
whom I have read have made much of an effort to provide any such 
reasons, Citing all the precedents for history as a chronological 
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account from Herodotus to Nevins doesn't add up to an argument, but 
only to a mound of moribund examples, And while few of us would eschew 
the fame and almost none, the royalties to be gained from writing a 
really popular work, self-interest and social duty are hardly the same 
thing. (Worrying about history becoming too narrowly professional, as 
Kocka (1982) and Yardley (1982) do, is needless, for this is one 
particular problem which the free market can solve.) 
A really comprehensive synthesis, moreover, one which attempted 
to cover most aspects of a society, could hardly be narrative in 
structure, for there would be too many different, only feebly connected 
stories to tell, In the past, grand narratives were narrowly political 
or military, Is it any longer possible to pretend that such views are 
synthetic?3 And even if someone found a way to construct a grand 
synthesis of social, political, economic, and intellectual history, he 
would, of course, have to build on the "research reports" of others, 
many of which would be quantitative in nature,4 Since grand syntheses 
?.re few, and monographs, necessarily many, there would still, even in 
this scheme, be much need for QUASSH, 
It also seems to me that synthesis retreats before 
knowledge, that coherent accounts of very large topics launch, rather 
than crown what Imre Lakatos called "scientific research programs," and 
that new syntheses in mature subjects can be produced, if at all, only 
by people who consciously or unconsciously blind themselves to the 
clutter of a burgeoning scholarship, Thus, synthesis for synthesis' 
sake may reduce rather than add to the sum of knowledge, Narrative, 
with its hidden assumptions, buried causal structures, and lack of 
falsifiability is too obviously an inferior r,ood to run QUASSH out of 
the marketplace,5 
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The Affinity for the Elect, If, as often noted, one of the 
appeals of QUASSH is that it enables one to say something about the 
masses, then those who doubt the importance or the possibility of 
learning much about anyone except elites may renounce QUASSll, Those 
who hold with Barzun that "history is about the active minorities to 
which majorities yield or consent" 0974, 111) can perhaps survive, 
depending on how large the minorities are, with only prosopography, 
factor or scaling analysis, and a theory of the state (if anybody ever 
develops a good one). And if one believes that "no amount of 
counting , , , is going to rea c h  into the heart of the matter" of his 
field's most important subject, and that what he admits is "the hoary 
method of argument by example, and elite example at that" is a surer 
means, then QUASSH may be useless to him, (Stone, 1981, 72, 76) Anyone 
who doubts Barzun's value judgment, or Stone's empirical judgment, or 
who thinks the conditions of the compelled or consenting majority or 
the interrelationships between elites and masses be of interest, 
however, will need a larger tool kit, (See Kousser, 1982.) 
The lleraclitan Fallacy, Since historians must be able to 
describe fundamental, massive, continuous changes over long periods of 
time, and since social scientific theories are rarely "dynamic," 
another argument goes, the models and methods of QUASSH are of li�ited 
and limiting use, (Hexter, 197la, Ill; Beach, 1980,) Even to the extent 
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that historians are normally concerned with such matters -- and nearly 
all of us have much more modest goals -- they need to measure changes 
systematically, which may require the use of statistics, and they need 
some way of determining what changes are really important and hints on 
what sorts of variables might explain the changes. (For an example of 
one such immodest study, see North, 1981J For these purposes, social 
science provides a reservoir of ideas with which to supplement more 
vaguely formulated "common sense," For most purposes in historical 
study, comparative static models will satisfice, and the dreams of 
grandiose, truly dynamic models are both utopian and usually 
unnecessary. (Ko us ser, 1981.) 
The Disappointed Lourdes Pilgrim, the "What's New?" Riposte, 
and the Disdain for Details Stance, QUASSH, it is often charged, 
hasn't fulfilled its promise, It hasn't answered the big questions, 
has with a few exceptions merely confirmed what was already known, and 
has become mired in tedious local studies and '�ision-limiting 
technical problem-solving." (Stone, 1979, 13; Bailyn, 1982, 6; Barzun, 
1974, 40. The quotation is from Bailyn,) Such comments seem to me to 
be based on fundamental misconceptions of the research enterprise, 
New r.10des of analysis, such as QUASSH, raise rather than settle 
questions -- answers are always only provisionally accepted anyway 
and in this, QUASSH has been quite fertile. 6 (Blaug, 1961,) In my own 
field, American political history, the notion of "critical elections," 
the "ethnocultural" explanation of electoral behavior, and the 
institutionalism vs. behaviorism debate, all products of QUASSH, have 
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reshaped the research agenda since 1960. Findings which may seem 
obvious in retrospect were often less apparent before the research was 
carried out, and in any case, replacing a good hunch with firm support 
for a proposition often represents an important advance. (Fobel, 1960; 
Tilly, 1981, 61.) 
Patronizing remarks about narrow foci or artisanry also 
mislead. Although local history may be merely antiquarian, community 
studies are often essential in the testing of larger hypotheses. If 
small areas are treated as quasi-experiments, then they become the true 
and sometimes the only possible laboratories for systematic empirical 
history. (See, e.g., Burton, forthcoming.) 
The details of equations or estimation, furthermore, are no 
less important for judging the degree of faith one should put in 
conclusions and often are considerably more revealing for this purpose 
than footnotes to "literary" sources. Critics of QUASSH try to have it 
two ways -- if the technical details are put in, they charge 
quantifiers with triviality; if they are left out, with mystification, 
This hardly seems fair, and for myself, I prefer distracting clarity to 
smoothly presented conclusions whose validity cannot be really 
ascertained. (Cf, Stearns, 1976, 250-51; Stone, 1979, 21.) 
The Drunk and the Streetlight, Devotees of QUASSH tend to 
concentratP or. questions for which the available quantifiable data is 
good, (Stearns, 1976, 250-51; Bailyn, 1982, 9.) Like the nighttime 
inebriate searching for his misplaced keys near the light, even though 
he lost them elsewhere, the scholar following such a strategy may be 
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left out in the cold. But of course all historians are limited by the 
available surviving data, those who rely on letters and diaries fully 
as much as those who use census records. And in fact, practitioners of 
QUASSH have greatly extended the range of usable historical material 
and have quantified documents which had never been systematically 
analyzable before. (See, e.g., Fogel and Engerman, 1974; Cox and 
Kousser, 1981.) 
"Method" Acting, Mentalit!i. and Mysticism. Mentions of Wilhelm 
Dilthey's verstehen technique have always reminded me of Marlon Brando 
trying to become the character he was playing. As good an actor as he 
is, he is always Brando, With actual historical persons, the problem 
is even more difficult, for, unless the available information on a 
character's inner life is extraordinarily rich, there is often no way 
to tell whether the historian-actor has played his role correctly. And 
in contradistinction to a fictive drama, the historian must maintain 
that his portrayal is not only true to life in general, but true in 
regard to a particular life. Can claims which are not falsifiable and 
which entail no precise falsifiable conclusions, even in principle, 
really be part of scholarship? Some apparently believe so, and contend 
in addition that historians are somehow uniquely qualified to make 
them, (Hexter, 197la, 131-32,) Thus Hexter contends that historians 
who free themselves from the shackles of analytical history, who 
discard as futile the notion of demonstrating sufficient causes, win 
1 , , • a chance to sense the force of the togetherness of event s, 11 
(Hexter, 197lb, 118.) While I enjoy speculation and Zen conundrums as 
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much as the next person, I have never been able to understand the basis 
for the assertion that verstehen amounts to more than informed guesses, 
or to determine clear standards for deciding which historian has "the 
Force" with him. 
I would not go as far as Stephen De Canio (1974, 118-19), who 
denies, in effect, that one can judge whether one conclusion from 
purely non-quantifiable evidence is better warranted than another -- at 
least, in the case of postbellum southern shnrecropping. I also 
believe that in many cases such evidence is necessary and desirable. 7 
Nonetheless, I am always a bit wary of calls for historians to be 
especially attentive to questions of hermeneutics and mentalit!i. 
because of my fear that these slogans mask a desire to relax standards 
of proof, (Hexter, 197la, 68, and Barzun, 1974, 91,96, explicitly 
endorse imprecision in this context,) In fact, since when we enter the 
jungle of non-quantifiable evidence, we must leave such weapons as 
significance tests and sensitivity analysis behind, we should be 
particularly on guard, more anxious than at other times to make our 
assumptions, reasoning processes, and evidence explicit. In these 
endeavors, practice in QUASSH may provide valuable training, even when 
its theories and techniques may not be applicable, 
The Populist Pose, the "Some of fu Best Friends Are 
Quantifiers" Dodge, and the Fingers and Toes and Anything Goes 
Routines. Few critics openly reject QUASSH out of hand anymore. (But 
see Barzun, 1974.) The line is rather that it is one of a variety of 
useful techniques, that historians should use anything which works, but 
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that only simple statistical methods and verbal theory should be 
employed, Anything else, anything which would require special training 
or more than the dilettantish knowledge of a social science which can 
be absorbed at lunch table conversations or by casual browsing in the 
library is undesirable, since history must, for unstated reasons, be 
accessible to all. (Handlin, 1979, 225-26; Hexter, 197la, 112-16, 142-
45; Stone, 1977, 6, 16-17, 33, 36-37; Stone, 1979, 11; Stone, 1981, 
86.) Fortunately, according to Hexter 097la, 142) the "arithmetical 
procedures" most useful to historians of ten require only ·� level of 
sophistication usually attained in the fifth grade of primary school� 
That is no doubt a good thing, for, Hexter says elsewhere, undoubtedly 
echoing the views of many other historians, that mathematics is " • • •  the 
least commonsensical of all human intellectual activitieR ... 11 (Hexter, 
197 lb, 49,)8 
Coming as it does from scholars known for their good works, 
high professional standards, and obvious devotion to the Protestant 
ethic, this gospel of easy salvation seems anomalous, The inconsistency 
between their treatment of QUASSH and their practices and 
pronouncements on other topics is apparently due to misunderstanding, 
QUASSH is at once sim ilar to and different from other kinds of history. 
To write or professionally evaluate Greek, Chinese, Byzantine, or nearly 
any other kind of history requires language skills, training, and a 
knowledge of the historiography which neither laymen nor historians in 
other fields usually possess, Everyman may be able to read a 
historical work in a field of which he is ignorant, and he may be able 
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to deterLline whether the account is logical and well-written, but he 
cannot determine whether it is less false than other explanations, to 
state the proposition in Popperian terms, or, to be more blunt if less 
precise, whether or not the work is true. (Cf. Hexter, 1971 b, 53-55,) 
A deep understanding of serious history is simply not open to the 
average intelligent reader, In that sense, history has long since 
ceased to be a popular subject and QUASSH marks no change of direction. 
From another viewpoint, however, it does represent a 
significant deviation, for it is a rather catholic subdiscipline, not 
so tied to time and place as other historical fields are, Students who 
pay its entry price -- Calculus, Linear Algebra, statistics, theory -­
rather than learn different languages, often have more in common than 
other historians, and can of ten judge each others' work more 
competently than is usual for histori<ms whose chronological and 
geographical specialties differ. To parody a bad poem, a regression 
coefficient is a regression coefficient is a regression coefficient. 
But just because the techniques of QUASSH can be applied in a very wide 
variety of cases, its study is more of a common necessity for 
historians than that of languages or other research tools whose 
usefulness is restricted to a particular time or place. And 
proficiency in QUASSJI is, perhaps even more than proficiency in 
languages, not easily attained, To be able to follow the journals in 
two or more disciplines, appraise the value of new works, and read up 
on novel or previously unexplored aspects of theory or methods requires 
a great deal more training and work than llexter and Stone believe 
desirable. Employing inappropriately simple methods or inadequately 
understood theory produces only flawed history. (See, e.g., Kousser, 
1976 and 1979.) 
The Messy Data Gambit. While it may well be that 
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printing parameter estimates to six decimal places reflects 
exhibitionism rather than a desire for exactitude, some critics put 
forth the quite different contention that historical information is too 
imprecise to require the use of sophisticated methods or theory. 
(Handlin, 1979, 11-14; Hexter, 197la, 143-44.) In fact, much 
quantifiable historical evidence is at least as accurate as a great 
deal of current data with which economists and other social scientists 
have to deal. Indeed, a considerable portion of modern econometrics -­
for example, generalized least-squares, logit and probit analysis, and 
unobservable variables techniques -- has been developed in order to 
deal with data which does not satisfy the assumptions necessary to 
employ simpler techniques. This fact implies that the converse of the 
critics' charge -- that the messier the data, the greater the 
necessity to use sophisticated analytical techniques -- is closer to 
the truth than is the original statement. (Fogel, 1971, 8.) 
The �thical" Misconception. Ignoring the clear and convincing 
explanations offered, e.g., by Davis (1971), some erstwhile friends of 
QUI.SSH continue to misconstrue the nature of the explicit 
counterfactuals often employed in economic history. (Herlihy, 1981, 
123.) To restate the case briefly: In any causal argument, a 
statement that X produces Y implies that if X were not present, either 
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some differEnt outcome would have occurred (in the case of a necessary 
condition), or perhaps that some other X would have caused Y to occur 
(in the case of a sufficient, but not necessary condition), In either 
case, counterfactuals are always logically implicit, and the 
cliometricians' innovation was just to spell them out, as an aid to 
understanding on both the reader's and the writer's parts. Thus, to 
criticize their use in principle, although not, of course, in 
particular instances, is to take either a logical stance in favor of 
muddledness or a stylistic position in favor of obscurity, or to assume 
that outcomes in the period succeeding every past event are never 
predictable enough to allow specification of a counterfactual, or a 
limited number of counterfactuals, which is simply another version of 
the view that, lacking absolute certainty, we can say nothing, (Martin, 
1979, 57 seems to take the latter position,) 
Terminal Confusion. A last set of criticisms relates not to 
QUASSH in general, but to its familiar handmaiden, the data-processing 
machine: Computer-based projects cost too much, Coding loses data or 
isn't error-free. The machine consumes the user's time and atrophies 
his mind, Record-linkage problems are insuperable. The data for 
completed projects is inaccessible, residing as it does on privately­
held computer tapes. (Stone, 1977, 26-27, 29, 33, 39; Stone, 1979, 6, 
11, 13; Stone, 1981, 63-64; Herlihy, 1981, 126-27.) None of these 
criticisms will bear close scrutiny, for they either ignore 
technological advances or fail to acknowledge com;•arable difficulties 
in non-quantitative research, 
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Comparative cost-benefit analysis must take account of all 
factors -- book acquisition expenses for libraries and opportunity 
costs for scholar� and students' time, as well as grant sizes, on the 
cost side; and support for training and scholars' research, gener;;l 
underwriting of university budgets, and, most importantly, the value of 
the projects' research to the scholarly community, on the benefit side. 
And they must be specific to particular projects. Here, I would stack 
up two undertakings that I know a bit about, the Philadelphia Social 
History Project and Time on the Cross, against any combination of 
the principal non- quantitative endeavors of comparable expense which 
come to mind, the papers of American Presidents and other notables. 
Whether all of their conclusions are ultimately accepted or not, both 
PSllP and TOTC have altered the research agendas and issued novel 
and elaborately documented challenges to many of the reigning dogmas in 
their fields. Can anyone make higher claims for the paper projects? 
While coding and record-linkage are, indeed, time-consuming 
tasks, the critics have ignored advances in hardware and software which 
virtually eliminate the necessity for making restrictive coding 
decisions (see Tilly, 1981, 53-83) and have greatly increased the 
reliability of record linkage (see Hershberg tl g., 1976), 
Likewise, while much quantified data remains outside depositories, and 
some cannot be pried out of scholars' hands, the critics have neglected 
to note that Fogel and Engerman and Stephan Thernstrom have placed 
theirs in the Michigan machine-readable archives, and that even before 
that, the authors of Time £!! the Cross allowed their harshest 
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challengers free access to their data, This act, the approximate 
equivalent of Stone's sending Trevor-Roper all his note cards for "The 
Anatomy," has no parallels outside QUASSH, so far as I know. (Stone, 
1948; Trevor-Roper, 1951.) Furthermore, machine-readable data is at 
least as easily checked for accuracy against the original sources as 
non-QUASSH historians' notes from manuscripts, newspapers, and 
published documents, and in fact, procedures for double-checking coding 
and data entry are much easier to institute, and are no doubt much more 
widely used in quantitative than in non-quantitative projects, How 
many non-QUASSH scholars regularly employ associates to make 
independent readings of manuscripts to confirm their own glosses or 
wade through extensive manuscript collections twice to be sure every 
quotation is precisely recorded? 
In regard to wasted time and mental numbness, tastes will 
perhaps differ. For myself, I would rate hours before a microfilm 
machine or reading somebody's letters, bills, and laundry lists, 
especially those in handwritten form, as at least as brain-curdling as 
trying to figure out how to make a computer do what I want it to. And 
both, in my experience, seem to obey the universal law of completion 
times: Make your largest reasonable estimate of the tiQe it will take 
to do something; double it; then apply the exponential function to the 
result. 9 
Defining Hardcore History, or .!. Know ll When .!. See .!!.• It may 
be that some aspects of the disputes between QUASSH and non- or anti­
QUASSH historians are non-terminating, not so much, I think, because 
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each side is equally correct, but because the entrenched intvreslR of 
each may so color their responses to particular arguments or their 
willingness to acknowledge the existence of certain points that even 
the most acute minds on each side will never meet. As children of Kuhn 
(1970), we should not be very surprised at this. 
One thoughtful proposal to circumvent this dilemma has been 
offered by Theodore K. Rabb (1981) . Since everyone except Barzun adheres 
rhetorically to the position that QUASSH is at least sometimes useful, 
the leaders of the profession, while they cannot agree on general 
standards of quality, might agree on the value of particular works. 
But is it likely that historians will be "indifferen[t] to methods as 
long as the results are illuminating, " as Rabb (1981, 330) asserts they 
should be? It seems improbable that Hexter and Rabb, for instance, 
will come to a quick consensus on the value of Rabb's Enterprise and 
Empire. (Hexter, 1971 a, 117-27. )  Richard Sennett's denunciation of 
Time on the Cross as "little more than an intellectual hoax" also 
seems to bode ill for rational agreement on quality. (Kousser, 
1980,890-91. ) And Rabb 's own acute suggestion that the differences 
between quantitative and mentalite historians is "a profound 
epistemological question, not just a matter of technique, " that 
mentalite historians "may regard a question like 'is it true?' as 
either meaningless or irrelevant" implies that, far from moving toward 
a potential consensus on quality, historians are becoming, to 
paraphrase John Dos Passos, "two nations. "  (Rabb, 1981, 323-24 , )  
Perhaps all this is too pessimistic and reflects my sectarian, 
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"chapel" upbringing. Perhaps the critics and their potential and 
actual parishioners will recognize their venial and more serious sins 
and convert or at least cease to condemn. But an examination of their 
recent preachments convinces me that rumors of the growth of a healthy 
latitudinarianism have been rather exaggerated. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. On this point, in contrast to others to come, I am happy to array 
myself with Hexter, See Hexter, 197lb, 286, 
2, . Al though Hobsbawr.( s 1980 challenge to the accuracy of Stone's 
description has attracted less attention than Stone's original 
article, as yet no one has performed a quantitative or any other 
test in order to determine which of them is more nearly correct. 
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3, Wood (1982, 8) has pointed out that Middlekauff's (1982) narrative 
of the American Revolution, wallowing in battle sketches, almost 
wholly slights many of the major developments in political thought 
and institutions during the period, not to mention the principal 
trends in economic and social history. What Wood calls '�ld­
fashioned narrative history with a vengeance," even by one of our 
finest traditional historians, therefore, is, almost of necessity, 
blindered, The situation in Renaissance history is similar, See 
Honour, 1982, 
4 .  Ilailyn, 1982, asserting that ''No effective historian of the future 
can be innocent of statistics • • •  " makes this point repeatedly. 
5. For a similar, more eloquent statement by a non-QUASSH historian, 
see Wood, 1982, 
6. In this respect, it seems to me, Stone, 1981, 63-64 is excessively 
uncharitable toward the Cambridge population history group, 
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Through works, such as Laslett 0965), Wri;;ley (1971), and Wrigley 
and Schofield 09nl), they have done and continue to do more to 
inspire interest in demography and family history and to shape the 
field's questions in a precise, scientific direction than the works 
of any other historians, That the specificity of the Cambridge 
group's positions and the openness with which their evidence is 
arrayed allows others to criticize them effectively, while the 
vagueness of the statements of historians such as Aries, 1962, 
makes them hard to disagree with, is, to my mind, only further 
evidence of the superiority of the QUASSH approach . 
7. I plead not guilty to Jurgen Kocka's charge that I wish to restrict 
history entirely to '�hose subject areas and problems which can be 
handled in a quantitative socia 1-scien t if i c way, • •  ," (Kocka, 
1982, )  The sentence in my text, above, was in the version 
of my paper which was distributed at the Washineton Conference, and 
Kocka had it available to him when he wrote up his comments, 
prepared for this volume, which he had presented orally in 
Washington. Moreover, much of my own work is based on non­
quantified sources , 
8 .  Read disingenuously, Hexter's statement is obviously false, for 
people from the Fifth Century onwards, from the most diverse 
cultures and speaking the most diverse languages, have agreed that 
the typical proof of the basic theorums of plane geometry made 
sense. The sense of the theorems, that is, has been understood 
22 
in common, in this as well as many other areas of mathematics, by 
people who could agree on little if anything else. There are, of 
course, abstruse philosophical conundrums about what constitutes a 
proof and similar �roblems, but these typically concern much higher 
branches of mathematics than are necessary to understand basic 
statistics, and in any case even the most skeptical generally admit 
that they can understand, if not wholly accept, the reasoning of 
their opponents. Probably, however, Hexter is simply saying that 
he has a hard time with math, As with all of Hexter's writings, 
the reader should allow, in deciding how to interpret this 
statement, for Hexter's puckishly hyperbolic style. 
9 .  I owe this law to my Caltech colleague Aron Kuppermann. 
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